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INTRODUCTION
There is a fundamental contradiction in economic knowledge concerning
the effect of population growth in less-developed countries (LDC's here-
after). On the one hand, the main theoretical elements suggest that more
itit
population retards the growth of output per worker. The overwhelmingly
important element in the theory is Malthusian diminishing returns to labor
as the stock of capital (including land) does not increase in the same
proportion as does labor. Another important theoretical element is the
dependency effect, which suggests that saving is more difficult for house-
holds when there are more children, and that higher fertility causes
social investment funds to be diverted away from industrial production.
Combined together in simulation models (e.g., Coale and Hoover, 1958;
Enke et al, 1971), these elements suggest that relatively high fertility
and positive population growth have a negative effect upon output per
I am very grateful to Stanley Engerman, Allen Kelley, Ronald Lee, and
Nathaniel Leff for unusually thoughtful and valuable suggestions at an early
stage of this work. I also .appreciate comments from Folke Dovring, Larry
Neal, Robert Solow and Etienne vandeWalle. And the opportunity to present
this paper and receive criticism at an Asia Society SEADAG Conference was
of great value. I will long be thankful to Robbie Cohen for her extraordinary
help in programming and executing the computer model. Dan Weidenfeld and
Carlos Puig made valuable programming contributions at a crucial point. And
it's about time I acknowledged Olga Nelson's wise and skilful typing.
**
Output per worker or output per worker hour, and not income per person or
income per consumer equivalent, is the appropriate measure of the productive
power of an economy. And productive power rather than the quantity of con-
sumption would seem to be the underlying concept in economic development.
Hence output per worker (Y/L) is the measure of performance used throughout
this paper.
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worker (and an even more negative effect upon income per consumer equiv-
alent, because the proportion of consumer equivalents to workers is higher
when fertility is higher)
.
But the empirical data do not support this a priori reasoning. First,
there is the historical fact that population grew at an unprecedented rate
-1750
during the period of Europe's development from 1650^onwards. And economic
historians (e.g., Mathias, 1969; Deane and Cole, 1964; Eversley, 1965, 1967)
demographic
have concluded that slower >s^ growth would have hampered England's
economic development. And there is no significant correlation in the his-
torical series of population growth and economic growth over the past
century or half century in those countries now regarded as developed. Se-
cond, the cross-sectional evidence from among the presently-developing
countries on the overall relationship between contemporary population growth
and economic growth certainly does not reveal a consistent pattern. Easter-
lin, Kuznets, Conlisk and Huddle, and Thirlwall all arrayed LDC countries
by their recent population growth rates and their economic growth rates,
to examine for a relationship between the two: (a) Easterlin's assessment
of his data is that "It is clear from the table that there is little evi-
dence of any significant association, positive or negative, between the
income and population growth rates." (1967) (b) Kuznets (1967) compiled
data on 21 countries in Asia and Africa, and 19 countries in Latin America.
In the separate samples, and in the 40 countries together, there is not
a significant negative correlation between population growth and growth
of per capita product; the coefficients are actually positive though very
output
weak, (c) Conlisk and Huddle (1969) regressed theAgrowth rate on the
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savings rate and the rate of population growth, over roughly 1950-1963
across the 25 LDC's that receive AID. The coefficient of population growth
*as .692 (t=3), suggesting that an increment of population has, ceteris
paribus , a positive effect on growth. (d) Thirlwall (1971) regressed the
percent change in output on the percent change in population over 1950-1966
Ln 32 countries, and obtained a coefficient just below unity, .907. (e) Chesnais
and Sauvy (1973) analyzed the relationship between demographic and economic
>rowth in the 1960's for various samples of up to 76 LDC's. and found non-
significant correlations (mostly slightly positive) . They also re-analyzed
Stockwell's (1972) finding of a negative relationship and found it to be
statistically unfounded. These overlapping empirical studies certainly do
lot show that fast population growth in LDC's increases per capita income.
3ut they certainly do imply that one should not confidently assert that pop-
ilation growth decreases per capita economic growth in less-developed countries.
,
Uowevcr
,
Habakkuk points out* that: "There is no lack of possible mechanisms by
which an increase in population could in principle have. . .favorable reper-
cussions on income." (1963, p. 614). And recent research has shown that
some of the possible mechanisms actually do operate (e.g., Boserup, 1965;
Mendels, 1970; deVries, 1969; Chenery, 1960).
Contradiction cries out. for reconciliation. But there are no economic
ideas that are serious candidates to effect such a reconciliation. Eco-
nomies of scale may work to mitigate the effects of population growth,
but no one except Clark (1967) believes that they are enough to nearly off-
set even the capital-dilution effect. Kuznets (1965) suggests that insti-
tutions are the key, and that demography by itself is not a major factor
in development, but in my judgment this difficult-to-work-with conclusion
should not be accepted until economic explanations have been exhausted.
When the theory and the data do not jibe, either (or both) may need
re-examination. This paper re-examines the theory, A model is constructed
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that includes the elements of the standard models, but that also embodies
other elements discussed in the qualitative literature as being important:
demand effects upon investment Emphasized by the historians of England),
the work-leisure choice (Tussing, in Kelley et al, 1971, writing on Japan),
variations in work activity as a function of differences in needs and
standard of living (Myrdal, 1968, Chapter 22), and economies of scale
(Chenery, 1960) . The model also embodies elements recognized elsewhere
in the development literature as important: intersectoral shifts in labor
(Lewis, 1955), depreciation (Enke, 1963), and land building (Slicher van
Bath, 1963) . The model solves by utility maximization - finding the
highest current leisure-output indifference curve that touches the cur-
rent production function. The allocation of labor to the agricultural
and industrial sectors, and the outputs of the two sectors, are found
as a function of observed elasticities of demand and allocations of out-
put at different incomje levels in LDC's.
Using a variety of parameters, the simulation indicates that positive
population
g
rowth produces considerab 1 y better economic performance in the
long run (120 to 180 years) than does a stationary population, though in
the short run (60 years), the stationary population has very slightly
better performance. A declining population does very badly in the long
run. And in the experiments with the "best" estimates of the parameters
for a representative Asian LDC (the "base run") moderate population growth
doubling over 50 years) has better long-run performance than either fast
population growth (doubling over 35 years) or slow population growth
(doubling over about 200 years) . Experiments with one variable at a time
between these
reveal that the difference y^ results and previous theoretical studies
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is produced by the combination of the novel elements - the leisure-output
work decision, economies of scale, the accelerator investment function,
and depreciation; no one factor is predominant. Perhaps the most important
result is that within the range of positive population growth, different
parameters lead to different rates of population growth as "optimum."
This means that no simple qualitative theory of population growth can be
very helpful.
THE MODEL
This description of the model skims quickly over the aspects that are
commonly found in such models, and dwells on the novel aspects. Additional
reasoning behind the specification, and data underlying the parameters,
is forthcoming in a longer work^ parts of which are now available upon request.
The variables and equations are listed in the appendix. Also given there is
a schematic of the model (Figure 3).
Output (Qp )
in the agricultural sector (denoted by F for "farm"; is mg*^
a Cobb-Douglas function of land plus other physical capital together (O
,
labor in man-hours (Mp), social capital (J), and the level of agricultural
productive efficiency at that point in history (O
:
The exponents of a and 3 in the base run are .5 and .5; the conclusions
are not different with other exponents, however.
Vwhich jg treated together with economies of scale, j
Social overhead capital^is made a function or" total labor force (l );
—
v~
- *ii2 h^rl
'
(2)
The parameter a
±12
is .20 in the base run (Chenery, 1960).
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Runs are also made with elasticities of .40 and of to see the impor-
tance of the scale parameter.
Agricultural investment is made a function of the "gap" between
the aspired-tp amount of farm capital and the actual amount of farm
capital:
h'%'
t
S,t
- »1140 °»t " a1141- < 3 >
The aspired-to level of farm capital is made
,
a multiplicand of farm
capital and technological efficiency, and is set at four times the output,
because all over the world the value of agricultural capital is very close
Veross^,
to four times as large as the value of a year ' s^output (Buck, 1930; Clark T 1957 ;_
(TJov^ of India, various^
4^F t ~ ^f t f t <f~years)
. **
where A„ is initially set at . do and IL, is initially set
at 4 QF>t
= 0.
The farmer is assumed to make up some proportion of the gap in each
year - 25% is the proportion in the base run. That is, the coefficient
a.., in equation (3) is set at .25 in the base run, and takes other values
***
in other runs. The term a , stands for depreciation and is set at
.005 in the base run; it is varied in other runs.
*
Agricultural investment in this context includes land clearance, local
irrigation, and construction of •-•—~^____. tools. The input of such in-
vestments is mostly off-season labor by farmers.
**
More specifically, A^ ^d K^ t "*?€. i*»»^*ll^ Sef t0 allow
for the 4/1 capital-out^fatio in agriculture.
***
The response functions for investment and technology in both sectors
are constrained to be non-negative. Depreciation can, however, drive
net investment negative on balance and does so in some trials.
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The agricultural Investment function and the agricultural production
function together have the unusual property that no conservation equation
connects them. That is, investment and production for current consumption
do not trade off within total production. This is because in peasant agri-
culture investment is mostly not a held-back part of total production.
The labor devoted to crop production is mostly not in competition with the
labor devoted to clearing new fields, irrigation works, and so on; rather,
the two activities take place in different seasons.
The absence of conservation is part-and-parcel of the model not being
constructed as a closed resource system equilibrated by rational economic
behavior on the part of producers and wage-earners. Rather the system is an
open set of equations each chosen pragmatically for its representation of
a relevant aspect of a dynamic production-consumption system; the marginal
products of labor and capital are therefore not kept equal in the agricul-
tural and industrial sector. This approach is less esthetic from the
standpoint of economic theory than is a neo-classical economic-development
model such as that of j^ejley et al. (1972). But there are two justifica-
tions for this choice. First, attempt .ng to construct this model in neo-
classical terms would run up against fundamental theoretical problems
such as the valuation of land and other agricultural capital that was
formed hundreds of years earlier (an income-stream approach being circular
here)
. And a neo-classical model embodying a labor-leisure choice by workers
would require breaking new ground in that direction (though see Sen, 1966;
Yotopolous and Lau, 1973) . Second the appropriate comparison of this
model and its results is to Coale-Hoover (1958), Enke et al. (1969), and
perhaps Limits to Growth . That is, the appropriate and fair comparison
is to other models whose primary aim is the same as this model - to assess
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the effects of different rates of population growth on the rate of economic
development - rather than to models which aim to accomplish other purposes.
The gain-in-technological-knowledge function in agriculture is made
to depend on time, as seems appropriate in most LDC agriculture. (Switches
in technique of the sort Boserup, 1965, emphasizes are embodied in the
production function.)
Vt-l = a115 *F,t (5)
with a,
1
-
= 1.0025 in the base run, and other values in other runs.
The labor-supply function will be described later in the context
of the integrated two-sector model.
VCdenoted by the subscript Gl/
Now for the industrial secT^£jr~~Jriie-THauSTrial - prc5auction function is
V = AG,t KG,t MG,t J t (6 >
Exponents are y = .4 and e = .6. in the base run.
Technological change in industry is a function of both time and the
change in output;
A
G,t+l
= A
G,t
+ a1170 AG,t
+ a1171 lo 6 (V " %,t-l j A^ (?)
Q„ -Q , l ' C '
. G, t G, t~l > nlog i_^ ! d
G,t
where a-.-^ is .0025 and a ,-,-,-, is .001, respectively, in the base runs.
Industrial investment is made to depend upon the change in industrial
output. It also depends upon the burden of youth dependency. And there
is a deduction for depreciation:
*
It should be noted that though the neo-classical sort of "sacrifice" -
the choice between investment and consumption - is not found in this
model, the model does embody the choice of "sacrificing" labor for
more agricultural investment and especially for more current production.
This latter choice, in turn, is left out of the neo-classical models.
So, on balance, this model would seem to need little apology on this score,
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K
G,t+l
=K
G,t
+all81 lo*
QG,t " AG,t-l
%t (
1 - a1182 Y0UTHt](KG,t] all83 KG,t
i G,tlog —1_ G ?t-1 > o
(8)
where a.
VG,t
= .0067, a. -.50 and a. 1QO = .0025, in the base run
'1181 ' 1182
(other values in other runs). That is, the amount of investment that
would otherwise take place is modified downwards by the youth dependency
burden. The depreciation parameter implying a 40-year life for equipment
is almost surely too small; a 20-year life is probably closer to the truth
in LDC's (Kuznets, 1966, Table 5.5), and some estimates have put depreciation
much faster even than this in some places (Fei and Ranis, 1964, quoted in
Kelley and Williamson, 1971).
More specifically, the absolute amount of youth dependency is calculated
in this context in the same manner as Leff (1969), in order to make the para-
meter consistent with his estimate,
14
£(MEN + WOM)
1
64
E(MEN + WOM)
15
The burden for any year is computed ar a difference between that year's burden
and the base year's burden:
14
E(MEN + WOM )
i-1
64
E(MEN. + WOM.)
. ., i it1=15
14
2 (MEN + WOM ) base year
1*1
64
Z(MEN, + WOM ) base year
i-15
ri4 64
Z(MEN. + WOM.,) base year/E(MEN + WOM ) base year)
1-1 i=15
The value -.50 for a..^ is roughly equal to Leff's estimate, and is used in
the base run. Values of zero and -1.0 are also used in other runs.
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If an "additional" child's parents choose to spend money on educating
him rather than in investing that sum in their farm or shop, the choice will
show up as a decrease in national saving. The same is true in the government
sector; a shift from investment in infra-structure or industry into schooling
will show up as a decrease in monetized saving, because most public educa-
tional expenses are salaries on current account. Therefore, the adjustment
of the savings rate for the youth-dependency effect allows for the cost of
the investment in human capital in outfitting additional children for the
labor force. This implicitly assumes that average new entrants to the labor
force have the same skills as average old entrants, which seems not, to be
true. But this is beyond the scope of this simulation,
A device to combine the agricultural and industrial sectors is necessary
to complete the supply side and constitute an aggregate production function.
This is done here by fixing the relative sizes of the outputs of the two
sectors in any given period as a function of the per-consumer-equivalent
r N ,**
lagged
income^ Y/C)in the previous period. That is, at aAY/C of $75, total output
is set at 35% industrial output and 65% agricultural output. At a Y/C of
$1,000, output is set at 90% industrial output and 10% agricultural output.
Theoretically it is conceivable to develop this model with the three
mutually-competing outputs of agriculture, industry, and leisure. But this
would present great problems both in making it intuitionally satisfactory
and in developing calculational methods.
**
C * consumer equivalents - .11 (MEN + WOM ) + .14
.39
14 14
EMEN + EWOM
5 5
+ .90
24 24
EMEN + EWOM
15 15
+ 1.0
4 4
EMEN + EWOM
1 1
99 99 1
EMEN + EWOM
15 15
This calculation of consumer equivalents is based on the weights of
Kleiman (1967) and others for the amount of consumption of people of
various ages in LDC's. The appropriate weights change in the course of
economic development. But the lack of such an adjustment here is not
likely to make a major difference in the simulation.

QG,t
.35 +tey
$75
(.90 - .35).
QF,t+QG,t $1000
- 75
_
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These divisions roughly correspond to the facts for LDC's and MDC's in
the world today, and reflect observed income elasticities for the two
types of goods. Between these two points the interpolation is linear,'
(9)
This function does more than allow for the Engei-effect difference in
proportions of agricultural and industrial consumption at different levels
of development, however. It also allows for the effect of different de-
pendency ratios on output ? as follows: an additional baby born in a
given family does not immediately alter total output, but it does im-
mediately lower the income per-consumer-equivalent, hence immediately
producing an increase in the proportion of total output that is agri-
cultural.
The accounting identity for the aggregate production function:
Y
t
= V + QG 5 t " h>t Kf,t 4,t JF,t + AG,t 3.t 4,t JF,f (10)
Given that for any amount of Y^ the l nounts of Q„ and 0_ are fixed,
C F, t G, t
there is a single-valued amount of Y^ that will be produced for any given
input of labor hours, M. (All the other terms in the production functions
are predetermined.) Hence the community (in the model) can choose without
further complication between just the two goods, leisure and output.
The demand side is a set of tastes for various mixes of leisure and
output, i.e., a set of Indifference curves. The indifference curves are
constructed for a "representative" worker, for intuitional purposes, and
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are then summed over the number of workersy
' CEach indifference curve is loga-
rithmic to reflect the almost-universal observation in psychology that pro-
portional differences are felt to be equal-size differences.
c\o?? C This functional form also is commonly assumed
by economists (on the basis of intuition and casual empiricism) in discus-
sions of the marginal utility of money, taxes, and so on. Sensitivity ex-
periments have not been done with other functional forms of the indifference
curves, but such experiments are no easy matter computationally.
in Figure 1
Each indifference curveA at a given time t is equivalent to a straight
line drawn on a semilogarithmic graph. The horizontal
axis measures work effort from 0% to 100% of possible yearly man hours
(actually to 1.0 for the variable 3). Each indifference curve D, is
formed as follows:
D
k t
= ORIGIN. + b
fc t
(antilog 8^), (11)
where b. Is the slope that characterizes any one indifference curve within
the set of indifference curves at time t. The origin of the indifference
function is at a point on the horizontal axis equal to -.52 in the base
run, and at other values in other runs. Only values < Z < 1.0 are allowed,
to reflect the fact that no one can work less than zero hours or more than
his maximum. The height of ORIGIN depends upon (a) dependency as measured
by the ratio of consumer equivalents to workers; the larger the number of
dependents, the more the worker "needs" goods, and the more work he will
For data on the variation in hours worked per week in industry in
countries with different income levels, see Denison (1967), Kreps (1967),
Moore (1971), and Winston (1966). Evidence that consumption aspirations af-
fect work effort is shovm in Taiwan by D. Freedman (1972). The higher
the aspiration index - a composite of the respondent's plans and desires fo
the purchase of consumer durables - the more likely the wives (of wage-and-
salary workers) are to be employed. The proportion ranges from 25% to 33%
over the aspiration index. Taiwanese, families with "modern" consumption
patterns are also likely to save more (D. Freedman, 1970).
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trade for output, ceteris paribus ; (b) the aspirations function RELASP, which
rises less than proportionally with real income, in accordance with such
studies as Fuchs and Landsberger (197j; and Centers and Cantril (19 6);
(STD
t
)"
(c) the "standard of living *! the basis for the standard of living is actual
income, but the standard of living is assumed to change less rapidly than
actual income.
ORIGIN -
t
RELASP
•i H & (12)
The elements in equation (12) are as follows:
Y
STD =
t"
subject to
' Vl (13)
(1-all93
)STVl i STDt i (1+all93 )STDt-r
The constraint on equation (13) ensures that the standard of living does
not rise or fall at a precipitous rate; its movement is less volatile than
that of real income. This reflects the behavior of the consumption function
over business cycles, changing less rapidly than income. The constraint
parameter a „, is .015 in the base run.
Figure 1
The RELASP aspirations function varies inversely with income, linearly
over the range of income $75 to $1,000.
Vl
- 575i
a
141
is
"* and a142 is " 2 in the base run "
64 64
L t labor force = I MEN + .5 I WOM . (15)
8=15 g g=l5 8

o >.
c
£
en
il
CM
a
is:
DC
O
LL
O
LA.
o
o
C
o
c
< 0.
OR
N
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The labor force counts each man aged 15-64 as a male-equivalent worker,
and each woman as half a male equivalent worker. (This assumes she spends
at least half her time working in the home, work which is outside the scope
of our model.) The consumer-equivalent function was defined earlier.
The system is solved by finding the value of Z which corresponds to
the point of tangency of (a) the aggregate production function (equation (10)),
and (b) the highest among the indifference curves (equation (11)), that
touches the production function^ This solution simultaneously fixes the
amount of output and the total labor input in man-hours. Formally
Y
I £) = Y at the point of solution, or structurally, log L = log D + b^. (16)
All the other elements in the production function and the indifference
curves are predetermined by the prior year's values, and hence are con-
stants in the numberical solution. The solution is actually obtained by
an iterative convergence program. The values so obtained check well with
analytic solutions obtained for the special cases where they could be found.
The numbers of persons of various ages eligible for work in any year are
functions of births and deaths in earlier years. The death rate is a
function of the prior period's income* For each cohort in each period,
the death rate is a logarithmic interpolation between the mortality
schedules for India and Sweden, setting $75 and $1,000 per capita as the
endpoints of the interpolation.
The fertilityjfunctions - in the form of fertility ratios - are the
controlvariable in the model. Three functions depend upon per-consumer-
equivalent income. The func-
tion called "Fast faling response to income" (or "Fast fall", for short),
*
Krishnamurty (1966) estimated that for India over the period 1922-1960,
the elasticity of the death rate per 1000 population was about -2 with
respect to real per capita income, allowing for trend. The elasticities
would surely be greater at the lower ages, weaker at the. higher ages.
(The elasticities surely would be weaker at ranges of income higher than
India's, of course.)
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declines with an elasticity of 1.0 as income rises. The function called
"slow fall" declines with an elasticity of .5,
WlA "Up then fast fall" has
fertility rise with income at first, and then fertility falls with an
elasticity of 1.0 also. The effects of these functions can be gauged best
by the number of consumer equivalents in various years as seen in Table 1.
But the population size varies from run to run because fertility and mor-
tality are functions of income, and income is a different function of fer-
tility in runs with different economic parameters.
There is also a fertility structure with 1,000 births each year, the
starting point of the system (called "Thousand births") . And there is a
structure with a constant ratio of births to women aged 15-44 roughly
equivalent to a crude birth rate of about 32, called "Constant high." The
structure "Constant very high" has a birth/woman ratio equivalent to a CBR
of 42. And in some runs there are structures with CBR's of 25 ("Constant
moderate") and 37.
THE FINDINGS
1. Using those parameters that seem most descriptive of LDC's today,
the very-high birth-rate structures and the very-low birth-rate structures
both result in lower long-run per-worker outputs (hereafter referred to
as "economic performance") than do birth-rate structures in between. It
will surprise no one in this decade that very high birth rates are not
best. But the outcome that very substantial birth-rate structures produce
higher incomes in the long run than do low birth rates runs very much
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against the conventional wisdom. The same result appears with quite dif-
ferent levels of the various parameters
.
More specifically, columns 4-6 i Table 1 show the per-worker output
in various years for the six experimental birth-rate structures described
earlier, and whose population sizes in various years in consumer equivalents
L(Qr row 1 of Table 2}. This data is_plotted_. in Figures 2a
are shown in columns 1-3 ofTable
T
A In the earli'estT'yeaFs the" very-low- "*\^[and 2b,
fertility populations have slightly better economic performance. But as
time goes on, the very-low-fertility and very-high-fertility populations
fall well behind the. moderate-fertility population. Much the same result
appears in runs with a wide variety of parameters subject to the discussion
to follow.
Table 1 and Table 2
The difference between these results and those obtained by Coale and
Hoover (and the more recent work in that tradition such as that by Tempo)
is due to the inclusion in this model of several factors omitted from the
Coale-Hoover model :^ the capacity of people to vary their work input in
b)
response to their varying income aspirations and family-size needs
;
A an
e)
economies-of-scale social-capital factor
;
A an industrial investment function
(and an industrial technology function) responsive to differences in demand
(output'
,
and Aan agricultural savings function responsive to the agricul-
tural capital/output ratio. These factors together, at apparently-reasonable
parameter settings, are enough to offset the capital-dilution diminishing
returns effect as well as the effect of dependency on saving found in the
Coale-Hoover and Tempo models.
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The model surely contains some specifications and parameter esti-
mates that are overly-favorable to population growth. But there are also
specification and parameter estimates that are overly- favorable to slow
or no population growth. Examples of the latter are: (1) Low depreciation
(and the accompanying investment function) turns out to be favorable to
relatively low population growth. And the industrial- depreciation para-
meters used are almost surely too low, which therefore makes the conclu-
sions drawn from the simulation even stronger, a fortiori . (2) Making allow-
ance for the effect of the rise in skills over time of the new labor-force
entrants would tend to work against the negative dependency burden and be
favorable to population growth, but this effect is not included in the
model.
-
\

Table 1
Results of Base Run
(For a summary of the parac ters, see Table 2 Row 1)
Consumer
Equivalents
(C) In tens of
thousands
of consumer
equivalents
Output per Worker
Y
(r-) In Constant
Dollars
Index of Labor
Utilized in (Z)
Column. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year 60 120 180 60 120 180 60 120 180
Fast falling fertility
response to income 36 34 28 443 552 472 .54 .53 .60
Rise and fast fall 53 105 104 438 715 915 .54 .46 .43
Slow falling response 46 78 111 442 696 1076 .54 .46 .37
Thousand births 39 45 48 446 641 949 .54 .47 .40
Constant moderate 25 ratio 41 73 152 438 680 1058 .54 .46 .37
Constant high 32 ratio 57 158 512 438 692 1025 .53 .47 .40
Constant 37 ratio 73 283 .242 432 666 926 .54 .49 .44
Constant very high 42 ratio 93 477 2723 423 622 812 .55 .52 .48
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2. In the base-parameter run the moderate-fertility populations enjoy
more leisure in the long run than do the low-fertility and high -fertility
populations. This may be seen in columns 7-9 of Table 1.
(columns 19, 21 and 23 in Table 2)
3. In many runs with a variety of parameters^, over quite a wide range
of moderate-to-high birth rates, the effect of fertility upon income is
not spectacularly large—seldom as much as 25% even after 180 years (though
the difference between low and moderate birth rates is great) . This is
extremely surprising at first thought. But this is what Kuznets expects:
...given the political and social context, it does not follow
that the high birth rates in the underdeveloped countries, per
se, are a major cause of the low per capita income; nor does
it follow that a reduction of these birth rates, without a
change in the political and social context (if this is possible)
,
will raise per capita product or accelerate its rate of growth.
We stress the point that the source of the association between
demographic patterns and per capita product is a common set of
political and social institutions and other factors behind both
to indicate that any direct causal relations between the dem-
ographic movements and economic growth may be quite limited;
and that we cannot easily interpret the association for policy
purposes as assurance that a modification of one of the variables
would necessarily change the other and in the directions indi-
cated by the association. (Kuznets, 1965, p. 29)
Still, this phenomenon demands explanation. And an explanation seems
to be forthcoming within this system, as will be seen in the results to
be described presently.
4. One important element offsetting the capital-dilution effect is
the difference in work done per year under the different birth-rate structures,
as may be seen in columns 7-9 of Table 1. In year 120, the average worker
works at 52% of capacity in the highest birth-rate variation, and at 47%
in the next-highest birth variant. This difference of 5/47 or 10% goes a
long way to make up for lesser capital per worker in the higher fertility
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variants. In the industrial sector this also makes possible an important
effect on investment. (In the agricultural sector, population growth and
output increase immediately cause a parallel increase in agricultural
investment.) Other factors that help account for the lack of difference
in economic performance among the moderate-to-high birth rates will be
discussed below.
The effect of the variations in work supplied in response to aspir-
ations and perceived need in the base run may be seen with the aid of a run
where the work supplied per worker is held constant in all the birth-rate
variations, other parameters being the same as in the base run. The results
shown in row 2 of Table 2
Table 2
5, It is of fundamental interest that economic performance does not
come out to be a mono tonic (inverse) function of fertility. An important
element in this finding is the economies-of-scale variable J. Its impor-
tance is shown by the fact that when the parameter is set so that there
is no increase in social capital as a function of labor-force size rather
than the Chenery estimate used in the base run, there is almost (but not
quite) a mono tonic (inverse) relationship between birth rate and economic
performance, as seen in row 3 of Table 2. But the economies-of-scale
social-capital factor is not the sole factor, or even the dominant factor,
in the inferior performance of the low-fertility structures relative to
the moderate-fertility structures. This may be seen in the inferior per-
endogenous ("Fast falling" in column 12 in
formance of the lowest.birth-rate structure even with no economies of scale*
row 3 in Table 2). And in various other runs with zero economies of scale,
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the relationship is also not monotonic. When depreciation is made higher
than usual, for example, the low constant-fertility-ratio population does
much better in the first 60 years than does the moderately-high constant-
fertility-ratio population, but in the long run higher fertility does much
better (row 4 in Table 2) . The same is true when investment is made more
responsive than usual to output; the low constant- fertility-ratio has
eventually declining economic performance, though higher fertility-ratio
variations do not (row 5 in Table 2)
.
When the economies-of-scale effect is twice as great as in the base
run, the highest fertility structures have better economic performance
than any of the populations with lower birth rates (row 6 in Table 2)
.
6. The determinants of physical investment are crucial in this model
as in all other economic models. It is a fundamental difference between
this and Coale-Hoover-type models that gross industrial investment depends
here upon demand, as measured by the change in last year's industrial out-
put less the prior year's output, rather than being a proportional func-
tion of absolute output. This reflects the universal fact that investment
is responsive to business prospects. It also reflects the historians' re-
cent consensus that demand was a key factor in England's economic develop-
ment. And the empirical literature on investment in more-developed coun-
tries emphasizes the influence of changes in output on investment. And the
This would be somewhat less true If the effectiveness of labor were
made a function of past income, to represent changes in the quantity of
education and in its technological level. But educational investment
would be very positively correlated with physical investment, despite
its less cumulative nature. Therefore, the latter alone may be thought
of as a not-too-bad proxy for both physical and educational investment.
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concept of the accelerator provides theoretical foundation for this function.
Hence it seems that there is every good reason to make the investment func-
tion in this model a function of changes in output.
Though the result may seem surprising at first, it is reasonable
that a relatively small difference in industrial output should have a large
effect on industrial investment. Investors are likely to project a present-
period decline (or increase) in output into a future trend. And invest-
ment is undertaken with an eye to several periods in the future rather than
just one period. Hence the expected trend has a cumulative effect far
beyond the output results of a single year.
Inclusion of depreciation explicitly—rather than working with a
net investment function—has an important enriching effect upon the model
which allows interesting and realistic results to emerge. It is deprecia-
tion that brings about a decline in incomes when economic stagnation sets
in; without allowance for depreciation, income would remain much the same
in such stationary conditions. Such declines in economies are observed
both secularly and cyclically, and it Is a benefit that the model shows
them. Long-run secular declines are mostly found among the lowest-birth-
rate trials, and the cause is the failure of output to rise very much.
An example of such a decline is seen in the performance of the lowest
income-responsive birth-rate structure (row 7 in Table 2), which describes
a run with "lower groxfth" parameters, all the parameters being set at
values that seem more appropriate to an LDC in the 19th or 18th century
rather than in the 20th century.
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Another example of the importance of the depreciation function is
seen in two runs with no economies -of- scale that differ in the parameters
of depreciation of farm and industrial capital (rows 3 and 4 in Table 2)
.
Where depreciation is faster, the constant-moderate fertility-ratio
structure has better economic performance than the constant iow-fertility-
ratio structure. Where depreciation is slower, the constant low-fertility
structure does better. (The explanation is that a bigger labor force
increases output and hence increases investment, which is relatively more
important when depreciation is faster.)
These results suggest a population "trap"—though a very different
sort of trap than the Malthusian trap elaborated by Nelson (1956) and
Leibenstein (1954). The nature of this trap is that if population growth
declines too fast as a function of increasing income, total output fails
to rise enough to stimulate investment. Depreciation is then greater
than investment, and income falls. In the model this results in a return
to higher fertility and another cycle
s
though this may not be plausible
historically. If—as is more plausible historically—fertility continues
to be low, economic performance would continue to decline toward a low-
level plateau.
7. The dependency effect of children upon industrial investment has
considerable impact on the results. A base run but without such a de-
pendency effect shows a monotonically positive relationship of fertility
to income (row 8 in Table 2), whereas otherwise the relationship is
curvilinear as seen in the base run (row 1 in Table 2) . Removing the de-
pendency effect has the opposite effect from removing the economies-of-
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scale from the base run (row 3 in Table 2) . And there is probably much
more doubt about the fact and size of the dependence effect than about the
economies-of-scale effect. This suggests that models such as Coale-Hoover
and Enke et al» that embody a dependence effect but not an economies-of-
scale effect are seriously biased against population growth for this
reason alone, even if for no other.
Removing both economies-of-scale and the dependence effect is pretty
much a trade-off (row 9 veraus row 1), though the relative strengths of
the dependency and economies-of-scale effects are influenced by the rate
of growth produced by the other parameters.
8. The advantage of moderate birth rates over low birth rates
generally appears only after quite a while - say 75-100 years. This is
another reason why the results found here differ from those of the
Coale-Hoover and Tempo models, in which the time horizon is only 25 or 30
years (55 years in the Coale-Hoover minor extension) , whereas the time
horizon here is 180 years (longer in some cases) . This points up the
grave danger in using short-horizon models in the study of population,
whose effects take a long time to begin and much longer to cumulate.
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9. In an attempt to understand the difference in the common judgments
about the effect of population growth in 18th century England and 20th
century India (and other contemporary LDC's), separate sets of parameters
were constituted to picture the two situations. The main differences are
in the functions for economies-of- scale, agricultural Investment response,
industrial investment, industrial technology, the maximum increase in as-
pirations function from year to year, and the extent of increase in aspira-
tions as a function of income. The more specific description i6 found in
the coefficients in rows 10 and 11 in Table 2. The results indicate that
up to very high fertility
high population growthAIs indeed very beneficial for economic performance
with the parameters chosen to represent England.
And very slow population growth is slightly (and only slightly) better
for India than is moderate growth - and zero growth is worse than both.
If these sets of parameters represent 18th century England and 20th century
the effects of on income
India, the different judgments about.populat ion growth.in the two situations
may be considered reconciled.
Though income per capita and output per worker grow slower with Indian
parameters than with 18th century English parameters, the simulated Indian
population benefits from a much larger quantity of leisure—due to the lower
income aspirations set into the Indian model. A run in which the same as-
pirations function is given to both country situations markedly reduces the
leisure differential. But the output-per-worker differential is reduced
and 13
much less, though substantially (ro«s 12 -in Table 2).
The reader may wonder how important the economies-of-scale parameter
is in the comparison of 20th century India and 18th century England. The
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previously-described sets of parameters were therefore run with the same
economies-of-scale parameters as in the base run. The results are shown in
rows 14 and 15 in Table 2.
10. Several sensitivity experiments were made with the fundamental
economic parameters of the system that have no strong theoretical tie to
the effect of fertility. These separate experimental variations in the
base run include using, a) Cobb-Douglas exponents of .4 and .6 instead of
.5 and .5 in the agricultural production function and, b) capital-output
ratios of 4 in both industry and agriculture. The insensitivity of the
basic findings to these experiments is encouraging. It increases con-
fidence that the basic model is not flawed in a basic structural fashion.
And it also suggests that the factors that we have chosen as population-
sensitive are indeed more important in this context than are the other
structural factors.
Another source of confidence in the model and its results is the fact
that the absolute size of the per-worker results is very different with
different sets of parameters, but the relative results are much the same,
as seen in the various runs in Table 2.
11. The differences in economic performance in the early years seem
small in all runs* much smaller than the sorts of differences in performance
one finds in the Coale-Hoover model. One of the larger differences is
between $239 and $210 in "India" in year 60 for the low constant fertility
ratio and the highest constant fertility ratio, and even this difference is
large compared to the results of other models. (And by year 180, the
low-fertility structure comes to have relatively poor economic performance.)
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This model yields no direct answers to policy questions. Any popu-
lation-policy decision must employ a discount factor commensurate with the
effects in various periods of the future. And the range of plausible
choices of the discount factor is very wide indeed, ranging from an almost'
equal weighting of present and future generations' welfare to discount
factors that make quite unimportant everything that will happen more than
15 or 20 years in the future. The results of this long-run model may,
however, be relevant to policy discussions which do not heavily discount
the future. In any case, the main thrust of the model is analytic
rather than policy-making.
Nevertheless,
\
\
\\
\
\
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it is natural to ask about the "optimum" fertility structure.
Only a small sub-set of the large number of possible fertility structures
have been tried, of course, but they would seem to sample the important
possibilities. The generalization may be hazarded that some population
in the long run * M
growth is beneficialAin all the circumstances we examined. The best rate
long-run
of growth in terms ofAoutput per worker (or incomeper consumer equivalent)
is relatively slow growth under some reasonable sets of conditions—
a
doubling in perhaps 90 years—whereas with some other sets of conditions
the doubling time for the best economic performance is considerably shorter.
differences
But perhaps it is misleading to even discuss the a * because the dif-
ferences in economic performance between the "best" fertility structure
and a wide range of other moderate-to-fairly-high rates of growth are
relatively small by any measure—most especially by comparison to the differ-
ence between the economic performance of positive population growth and
negative population growth.
Though within the wide range of moderate-to-fairly-high population
growth economic performance does not vary much and the palm sometimes goes
to higher and sometimes to lower growth, populations with lower (but not
declining) fertility almost always have somewhat more leisure—an important
economic property of any system. (Populations with no growth or decline in
population size do worse in both respects.)
13. Perhaps the most important result in the simulation experiment is
that it shows there are some reasonable sets of conditions under which
Vat some_point8 in time than does^,
fairly high fertility shows better economic performance )C~ low~t*ert~lXity,
and that there are also other reasonable sets of conditions under which the
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opposite is true. There are even sets of conditions well within the bounds
of possibility under which extremely high fertility offers the highest
V_in the long run.^
income per capita and output per worker)^ That is, the results depend upon
the choice of parameters within the range that seem quite acceptable. This
implies that any analytic model of population which concludes that any one
fertility structure is unconditionally better than another must be wrong
—
because that model's construction is too simple, or for other reasons.
The sole exception to this rule of non-generality is fertility so low
as to be below replacement. Such a fertility structure does poorly under
every set of conditions simulated here, largely because a reasonable in-
crease in total demand is necessary to produce enough investment to overcome
the drag of depreciation.
EVALUATION OF MODEL AND FINDINGS
Though the method used here is computer simulation, this model is of a
theoretical nature
—
just as are analytical models. Both types of models
have in common the problem of evaluation and validation. Best of all would
be to fit the theoretical outputs to empirical data of the same nature—in
this case, year-to-year movements of an economy of the sort being modeled.
Development models such as those of Fei-Ranis (1964), and Kelley et al
(1972), have done that. But this is not possible here, just as it is not
possible with other population models such as Co ale-Hoover. The main
reason is that the aim of these models is to compare the results of
The advantages and disadvantages of computer-simulated theoretical models
versus analytical theoretical models are well-known, and need not be dis-
cussed here.
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population growth structures that have not existed. In such a situation,
one may evaluate the validity of a model on these two criteria taken to-
gether: 1) the theoretical and empirical reasonableness of the model's
structure; and 2) how well the over-all results fit the range of empirical
experience. Let us test the model against these two criteria in that
order.
1. First, the model includes all the main accepted elements that are
found in other LDC population-growth models—such as diminishing returns,
and the effect of dependency. Second, it also includes other elements
that are generally agreed to be important in qualitative discussions but
that are omitted from previous models: demand and its effect on investment,
the shift of labor from agriculture to industry, the leisure-output choice,
and the effect of aspirations. Third, the model substitutes an accelerator
investment function for the constant-proportion-of-output function found
in Coale-Hoover and other work in that tradition; an accelerator function
has all the weight of economic theory and empirical findings behind it.
Taken together, these three aspects of this model's construction should
make it more convincing than previous models—having all their good features
and a lot more. The reasonebleness of the wide range of parameters must be
judged by each reader.
2. The results of this model agree better with the historical and
cross-sectional data mentioned in the introduction than do previous models.
On the basis of this combination test, this model and its results
should be more acceptable than Coale-Hoover and its descendants. The model
does, however, have the damning defect that almost everyone "knows" that
its results are wrong. Therefore, it has little chance of being taken
seriously and it will not even find its way into print very easily.

IS POPULATION GROWTH REALLY BAD FOR LDC'S IN THE LONG RUN?
A RICHER SIMULATION MODEL*
Julian L, Simon
Summary
This simulation model of the effects of population growth in an LDC
economy adds several important elements omitted from previous models:
the work-leisure choice and the effect of family size on the amount of work
done; agricultural and industrial investment functions responsive to demand;
depreciation of capital assets; and an allowance for economies of scale and
the creation of social infrastructure. These elements, combined with the
elements of the standard model and with all parameters estimated from the
best available empirical studies, yield results quite different from Coale-
Hoover and similar studies. Within the 25-year horizon used by other models,
slow or no population growth produces higher per-worker output than does
higher population growth, but only slightly . And in the very long run -
a horizon of 60-180 years, which is much beyond the horizon of the comparable
models in the literature - moderate population growth produces higher
per-worker output than does a stationary population. Declining population
growth produces uniformly poor results in the long run.

Notes:
1. See Appendix for definitions of the variables.
2. The demand effects are embodied by way of the standard of living
(prior year's income) and the dependency effects (population variables).
3. Population effects are shown in heavy lines.
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Appendix
List of Variables
(Numbers at end of definition indicate equation in which the variable is
defined or specified.)
\t
G,t
V
F
G
GAP.
Vt
K
G,t
M
G.t
MEN
i
ORIGIN
QF,t
RELASP
t
STD
the technological know-how t«t use in agriculture at time t in
in the country being analyzed (equation 5)
« industrial know-how (equation 7)
B the number of consumer equivalents
* the set of indifference curves (equation 11)
= designates agricultural farm sector
=» designates industrial sector
= difference (proportional) between actual and aspired-to
agricultural efficiency-capital (equation A)
» social overhead capital (infra-structure) such as
roads (equation 2)
farm capital at time t, most of which is land (equation 3)
industrial capital (equation 8)
the number of male-equivalent workers available at
time t (equation 15)
** the total number of man-hours worked In agriculture
in year t
total man-hours worked In industry
= males of age I in year t
= origin on vertical axis of indifference curves (equation 12)
* agricultural output in year t, not including any saving
and investment in agriculture (equation 1)
industrial output, including investment goods (equation 6)
aspirations level at time t (equation 14)
standard of living at time t (equation 13)
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(List of Variables, continued)
WOM. females of age i in year t
Y = total output in year t (equation 10)
YOUTH youth dependency burden
Z = proportion of potential work-hours that are actually
worked in a given year t
a. , a 9 . . . parameters
a, 8, Y» £ = exponential parameters in production functions
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Summary of Main Structural Equations
Vt " *p.t *? "p
8 J
t
J , - J
t+1 t
l112
L
t " Vl
J
t-1
Vt+1 " Vt
a1140 GAP t "
a
1141
GAP.
Vt
_
4QF,t " a113 Vt Vt
aiieVtVt
Vt " a115 Vt
Vt" Vt KG,t MG,t Jt
A
G,t+l " AG,t
+ a
1170 AG
+ a1171
l0g Vt - Vt-1
KG,t+l ' KG,t
+ A1181 loS
G,t " QG,t-l
<G.t
<G,t
G,t
(1 - a
n82 YOUTH t ) KG>t - a^ KG
5ii
- .35 +
$75
<
Y
t-i
c
t-i
$75 - $1000,Vt + QF,t
Y
t " Vt + Vt
D
fc t
- ORIGIN
t
+ bk t (antilog Z fc )
fc.l
ORIGIN - L (RELASPJ (STD
J
t t t t
(.90 - .35)
^V
STD t-1
t C
subject to
t-1
(1 - an93 ) STDt_ 1 < STDt < (1 + aU93 ) STD^
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SP « .4 - .2 \-^1
LD Y
t t
Vl
Mortality,. «= f (log 7r~
x
Vl
L MEN + WOM aged 15-64
t t t
Fertility * various endogenous and exogenous functions,
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